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TEMPORARY INSANITY- FIRST LINE OF DEFENSE
IRWIN J. BLOCK*
The confusion in medical and legal circles surrounding the
defense of temporary insanity prompted the author to present the
viewpoint of a prosecuting attorney. This article was written
partially in response to an earlier article appearing in this publica-
tion, Reid, The Working of the New Hampshire Doctrine of
Criminal Insanity, 15 U. MIAMI L. REV. 14 (1960).
The author expresses the view that until medical science
has acquired a determinate knowledge of the complex subject of
mental disease, the McNaghten rile should not be rejected.
The case with which defendants obtain expert testimony that they
were "temporarily insane" is the greatest single cause for the continuing
battle between the law and psychiatry.
A plea of "insanity" will result in an examination as to the current
mental status of the defendant.' If he is found insane, and therefore
unable to stand trial, he will be committed to an institution and deprived
of his liberty. The defendant will probably consider this a greater personal
disgrace and more appalling than confinement in the state prison.
Under the plea of "temporary insanity," the defendant lapsed into
this insane state while the crime is being committed, and immediately
thereafter recovers his sanity. This plea merely requires a determination
of the defendant's mental condition as of the time the crime was com-
mitted. A verdict of not guilty by reason of temporary insanity will
probably return the defendant to society to broadcast, far and wide,
his triumph over law and order. The courts have the right to place
the defendant in custody on such a verdict,2 but are extremely reluctant to
do so. The writer has witnessed one court's refusal to honor such a request
and, in fact, has been unable to find a single case in this jurisdiction 3
where a defendant acquitted by reason of temporary insanity was thereafter
placed under any type of restraint. On a plea of temporary insanity the
court may, at the same time, require that a determination be made
of the defendant's competency to stand trial.4 In either event, the court
will not permit a defendant to proceed to trial unless it concludes that
he is mentally competent to stand trial.5 Thereafter, it would be difficult
*Assistant State Attorney, Dade County, Florida; LL.B., 1950, University of Miami.
1. FLA. STAT. § 917.01 (1959).
2. FLA. STAT. § 919.11 (1959).
3. Eleventh Judicial Circuit, Dade County, Florida.
4. FLA. STAT. §§ 909.17(2), 917.01(1) (1959).
5. FLA. STAT. § 917.01(2) (1959).
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for the court to reverse itself, and place the defendant in custody, upon
a verdict of not guilty by reason of temporary insanity. When the law
is changed to require the commitment to a state mental institution for
a minimum period of years of everyone acquitted by reason of temporary
insanity, the use of the defense of temporary insanity will be greatly
decreased.
The present rule in Florida on the issue of criminal responsibility is
based on the Advisory Opinion rendered in the House of Lords in 1843,
which stated:
To establish a defense on the ground of insanity, it must be
clearly proved that at the time of committing the act, the party
accused was laboring under such a defect of reason, from disease
of the mind, as not to know the nature and quality of the act
he was doing; or if he knew it that he did not know he was
doing what was wrong.6
Today, psychiatry is endeavoring to have the courts abandon the
McNaghten Rule and adopt what has come to be known as the Durham
Rule. This rule provides that the accused shall not be responsible for
his actions if, at the time he committed the criminal act, he was sufffering
from a diseased or defective mental condition and the act committed
was the product of this diseased or defective mental condition.7
Fortunately, the appellate courts in Florida, and in every state
but one,7'. recognize that the issue to be determined is one's accountability
for his criminal acts and not the question of whether he is mentally ill.,
The courts are still convinced, despite vigorous objection, that the
McNaghten Rule is the best available rule for measuring the mental
condition of the individual in terms of accountability for criminal acts.9
If the Durham Rule is adopted as it 'stands, convictions for serious
crimes will be as rare as a "hen's tooth."
Psychiatrists invariably agree that anyone who commits a serious offense
is sick-he is suffering from some mental disease or defect- and were
it not for the mental disease or defect the accused would not have committed
the offense. They have written that the time will come when stealing
or murder will be thought of as a symptom indicating the presence of a
disease.10 Notwithstanding the fact that psychiatrists are more limited in
their evaluation under the McNaghten Rule than the Durham Rule,
experience has demonstrated that they find little difficulty in diagnosing
defendants as temporarily insane. The Durham Rule would result in even
6. M'Naghten's Case, 10 Cl. & Fin. 201, 8 Eng. Rep. 718 (H.L. 1843).
7. Durham v. United States, 214 F.2d 862 (D.C. Cir. 1954).
7a. See Reid, The Working of the New Hampshire Doctrine of Criminal Insanity,
15 U. MIAMi L. REV. 14 (1960).
8. Piecott v. State, 116 So.2d 626, 627 (Fla. 1959).
9. Ibid.
10. Menninger, Medicolegal Proposals of the American Psychiatric Association, 19
I. CRIM. L., C. & P.S. 367, 373 (1929).
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this difficulty being removed, and it is quite probable that under the
new rule all who commit serious crimes might be considered temporarily
insane.
It is truly surprising that the law should have this difficulty with
psychiatry when, medically speaking, there is no such entity as temporary
insanity. 1 How can the law and psychiatry work out their differences
when there is no such medical phenomenon as temporary insanity, but
psychiatrists remain willing to testify, time and again, that an accused
is presently sane but was temporarily insane at the moment he committed
the crime? To medical men temporary insanity is as likely as a momentary
uremia in a man with perfectly normal kidney functions.' 2  In one case,
tried by this author in 1957, the doctor, after testifying to this condition
of temporary insanity, said that the shooting by the defendant of her
husband was therapy for her. Thereafter, he stated, it would take considerably
more stress to cause her ever again to lose her sanity temporarily.
The problem is to prevent persons who commit serious crimes, and
are found to be competent to stand trial, from being acquitted and
turned loose on society on a psychiatric diagnosis of temporary insanity.
The year 1957 was typical in the prosecution of capital cases in
Florida's Eleventh Circuit." An examination of the cases generally, and in
the light of both rules, reflects the following:14
1. In the fifteen cases in which the defense of temporary insanity
was interposed during the year, the jury or the court, under the
McNaghten Rule, convicted twelve as sane, acquitted one for
temporary insanity and, upon examination, committed two as
being insane and unable to stand trial.
2. The cases mentioned in the appendix to this article contain
projections of the author based on the Durham Rule and drawn
from conversations with psychiatrists who stated that the criminal
act of the defendant was the product of a mental disease or
defect. An analysis of the fifteen cases listed in the appendix,
using the projections under the Durham Rule, reflects that nine
of the defendants would surely have been acquitted by reason of
temporary insanity and four more might alsohave been acquitted
for this reason. Therefore, it is quite probable that the twelve
persons who had been convicted under the McNaghten Rule
would have been acquitted under the Durham Rule. All twelve
would probably be walking the streets at this time.
3. The defense of temporary insanity was raised in forty per
cent of the capital cases. The defense was not interposed, no
matter how bizarre the actions of the defendant, unless the
prosecution had a strong case.
11. GUrMACHER & WEIHOFEN, PSYCHIATRY AND THE LAw 397, 398 (1952).
12. Ibid.
13. FLA. STAT. § 782.04 (1959) (First degree murder); FLA. STAT. § 794.01 (1959)
(Rape); Eleventh judicial Circuit, Dade County, Florida.
14. See Appendix of Cases.
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4. Doctors retained by defendants generally believed their patients
to be temporarily insane.
5. There are minor discrepancies of psychiatric diagnosis in most
of the cases. In four of the cases listed (cases #2, #7, #8, and
#14) there is a direct conflict between the experts. In case #2,
for example, Doctor "A" says, "No definite evidence of any form
of neurosis, psychosis, or personality disorder. . . ." Doctor "B"
says, "Neurosis in the form of an inadequate emotionally unstable
personality .....
Is this proof of the statement that psychiatry is still more of an
art than a science?' 5 Through the years the defense of temporary insanity
has been mainly successful in cases involving the shooting of a wife's
paramour by the husband, 16 or the slaying by the wife of a brutal husband
who beat her unmercifully. Does this suggest that psychiatrists, as human
beings, occasionally permit their emotions to control their decisions?
Some time ago a defense psychiatrist who testified that the defendant
was psychotic, in contradistinction to the testimony of the court-appointed
psychiatrist that the defendant was not psychotic, heard the jury return
a verdict of guilty of murder in the first degree with a recommendation
of mercy.' 7 He left the courthouse, making the statement, "What a
disgrace it is to let twelve truck drivers determine whether or not a
person is responsible for his actions." This is not an isolated opinion in
the profession.. One writer considers it thoroughly illogical to entrust the
determination of the issue of insanity to laymen.' This is what is in
the minds of psychiatrists who advocate the adoption of the Durham Rule.
Psychiatry today presumes that any type of aberrant behavior is due to some
personality defect in the individual and that, therefore, he should be
treated-not punished. 19 It considers the punitive attitude of society
toward offenders to be a shortsighted-if not vindictive -reaction, a
carry-over from an earlier, more primitive society.20 Psychiatry believes
that its profession, and not the jury, should determine who is responsible
15. Sullivan, Psychiatry, 12 ENCYC. Soc. Sci. 580 (1937).
16. Texas has, to some extent, declared such a homicide justifiable. TEXAS PEN. CODE,
tit. 15, art. 1220 (Vernon 1925):
Homicide is justifiable when committed by the husband upon one
taken in the act of adultery with the wife, provided the killing take place
before the parties to the act have separated. Such circumstances cannot
justify a homicide where it appears that there has been, on the part
of the husband, any connivance in or assent to the adulterous connection.
17. FLA. STAT. § 919.23 (1959) reduces the penalty from death to life imprisonment;
the accused is then eligible for parole.
18. Zilboorg, Legal Aspects of American Psychiatry, in ONE HUNDRED YEARS OF
AMERICAN PSYCHIATRY, 1844-1944, 513 (1955).
19. Hall, Mental Disease and Criminal Responsibility, 45 COLUM. L. REV. 677, 711
(1945):
Conforming to this doctrine, another vigorous psychiatrist-critic of the
criminal law denies the responsibility of any criminal; he considers any
crime a 'pathological phenomenon.'
20. Blackman, Criminal Responsibility and the Community, 4 1. FOR. Sci. 403, 411
(1959).
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for his crime. On the surface it appears that the jury does determine
this question under the Durham Rule, but actually the jury can do no
more than echo the opinion of psychiatrists who testify under the rule.
As a matter of law, a jury cannot ignore the uncontradicted testimony
of the psychiatrist. When the jury does not echo the opinion of the
psychiatrist in its verdict, it is incumbent on the court to set aside the
verdict as being against the evidence and grant a new trial, or to enter
a directed verdict of not guilty by reason of temporary insanity. Lurking
in the background of this new rule is the philosophical concept that
punishment for crime is outmoded; that ethics and reason play a very
small part in determining our behavior; that all who commit serious
offenses are sick and should not be held criminally responsible for their
actions. The attempt to reshape the law is solely for the purpose of
imposing this new theory on society. Psychiatry should admit that its
ultimate aim is the elimination of prosecution and the commitment of
criminals to the custody of doctors for treatment and disposition. Society,
though, is not yet prepared to accept this principle. Under the McNaghten
Rule the protection of society is the paramount concern. The rule recognizes
that the science of psychology and its facets are concerned primarily
with diagnosis and therapeutics, not with moral judgments.
21
Ethics is a basic element in the judgments of the law and should
always continue to be so. 22 Until some new rule, based on a firm
foundation in scientific fact, for effective operation in the protection and
security of society is forthcoming, the McNaghten Rule should be followed.
The law should not blindly adopt the opinion of psychiatric and medical
experts and substitute vague rules that provide no positive standards, for
a legal principle which has proven durable and practicable for decades.
23
In order to promote Durham, it is contended by psychiatrists and
some authorities in the legal profession that the McNaghten Rule creates
rigidity and precludes inquiry into new concepts used by the medical
profession. -4 This suggestion is untenable. The McNaghten Rule first
says that there must be a defect of reason resulting from a "disease of
the mind." There is no restriction upon psychiatry using any recognized
diagnostic concept in determining whether there is a "disease of the mind."
There is nothing in the McNaghten Rule which prevents a psychiatrist
from using the same approach he would use in determining whether
the accused has a "disease of the mind" under the Durham Rule. If the
mind is not diseased, the expert should proceed no further. When the
mind is diseased, he is then asked to give an opinion as to whether the
disease is such as to prevent the accused from intellectually being aware
21. Commonwealth v. Wo6dhouse, 401 Pa. 211, 164 A.2d 98 (1960).
22. Ibid.
23. Ibid.
24. Sobeloff, Insanity and the Criminal Law: McNaghten to Durham, and Beyond,
41 A.B.A.J. 793 (1955).
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of what he was doing and knowing it was wrong. During the past one
hundred and fifty years the medical profession has said that it is impossible
to give an opinion of the intellectual capacities in issue under McNaghten.
During this period these same experts in the field of psychiatry have
taken the witness stand and testified, when necessary, that an individual was
or was not aware of the nature and consequences of his act and did or did
not know it was wrong.
The McNaghten Rule is further criticized as being based on an
outmoded theory of faculty psychology.25 Under the concept of faculty
psychology, a man was said to have different faculties of the mind, which
were separate entities. The mind was presumed to contain three basic
faculties: cognative-knowing; conative-willing; and affective-emotion.
Psychiatrists and psychologists now claim that the McNaghten Rule requires
the expert to take a single faculty, that is, knowledge - divorce it from
the other faculties of the mind, the will and the emotion- and arrive
at a decision based on this single faculty.2 6 The theory which is now the
vogue throughout the psychiatric commuInity maintains that the human
personality is an integrated unity in which the cognative (kf6wing)
faculty cannot be separated from the conative (willing) and the affective
(emotion) aspects of human life.27 The three faculties are allegedly one,
and the one is all three. Therefore, an opinion on any one single mental
process must necessarily include the other two. This proposal contends
that the McNaghten Rule is based on an entirely obsolete and misleading
conception of the nature of insanity, since insanity does not only or
primarily affect the cognative or intellectual faculty, but affects the whole
personality of the patient, including both the will and the emotion.28
Nowhere in the McNaghten Rule is there any restriction precluding
the expert from determining what effect the integrated personality of
the accused had upon his reasoning ability to determine right from wrong.
If it is claimed that reason and morals no longer control our actions;
that the individual is a slave to his integrated personality; that he reacts
automatically to the stimulus fed his personality, much like a Univac
machine, then the law should reject this theory. The only characteristic
that distinguishes man from brute is man's ability to reason and be bound
by simple moral duties.
25. Ibid.
26. Cohen, Criminal Responsibility and the Knowledge of Right and Wrong, 14
U. MIAMI L. REV. 30, 43-56 (1959).
27. Sobeloff, supra note 24, at 794:
Medical psychology teaches that the mind cannot be split into water-
tight, unrelated, autonomously functioning compartments like knowing,
willing and feeling. These functions are intimately related and inter-
dependent.
28. Report of the Royal Commission on Capital Punishment, Report, CMD.
No. 8932, para. 80 at p. 103 (1953). . : . I I
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Irresistible Impulse Becomes a Defense Under Durham
Throughout the years many medical experts have testified, from time
to time, that the accused knew right from wrong, but was unable to
control his actions because his will (volition) was destroyed. This is
generally referred to as an "irresistible impulse."
In one breath it is contended that the conative feature (will-volition)
overrides the cognative feature (knowing) to such an extent that the
individual knows that the act is wrong, but his diseased volition prevents
him from controlling his actions. In the prior breath it was maintained
that the normal personality operates as a unit, and one feature of the
personality cannot be divorced from the other feature. If the normal
personality operates as a coalescence of the various functions, how is it
possible that an essential phase of it, that is, volition-will, can be
seriously diseased while, at the same time, the cognative feature (knowing)
can remain normal?
29
In Anglo-American law criminal liability is imposed for the intentional,
or reckless, commission of forbidden harms. ° The harm is inflicted by a
voluntary act. Voluntary conduct, though, is the active aspect of intelli-
gence. 1 Under the integrated personality, if the volition is very seriously
diseased, it must necessarily destroy the cognative feature-the intellectual
ability to distinguish right from wrong-otherwise the premise of the
integrated personality fails. If the intellectual ability to distinguish right
from wrong is existent, the volition is not so diseased as to prevent
voluntary action. This was discussed as long ago as 1892 .2 There is no
other scientific method of determining when an individual's actions are
irresistible, or merely not resisted. Furthermore, those impulses which
are now resisted because of the penal law may hereafter become irresistible.
Although the law has rejected the theory of irresistible impulse as an
29. Hall, Responsibility and Law: In Defense of the M'Naghten Rules, 42 A.B.A.J.
917, 985 (1956).
30. Id. at 987.
31. WYATT, TIlE PSYCHOLOGY OF INTELLIGENCE AND WILL 153 (1930).
32. State v. Harrison, 36 W. Va. 729, 751, 15 S.E. 982, 990 (1892):
For myself I cannot see how a person who rationally comprehends the
nature and quality of an act, and knows that it is wrong and criminal,
can act through irresistible innocent impulse. Knowing the nature of
the act well enough to make him otherwise liable for it under the law,
can we say that he acts from irresistible impulse and not criminal
design and guilt? And if we are sure he was seized and possessed and
driven forward to the act wholly and absolutely by irresistible impulse,
his mind being diseased, how can we say he rationally realized the
nature of the act, -realized it to an extent to enable tis to hold him
criminal in the act? How can the knowledge of the nature and, wrong-
fulness of the act exist along with such impulse that shall exonerate
him? Can the two coexist? The one existing, does not the other
nonexist? Can we certainly say that a person who is really driven to an
act by such an impulse was capable, at the instant of the act, of
knowing its true nature?
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excuse for an unlawful act,33 it would become a defense under the guise
of the Durham decision.
Since the Durham decision there has been more criticism of its rule
than even the McNaghten Rule has incurred during its long history.
The McNaghten Rule reflects the traditional concept of our civilization
that man is a normal being; that he is sufficiently autonomous to render
moral judgments by himself. 34 The reluctance of the courts to accept
the doctrines of psychiatry in determining the issue of responsibility is,
therefore, on a very sound and firm basis. The plain fact is that the
.chief limitations on any solution of the problems arising from mental
disease is the lack of medical and psychiatric knowledge of mental disease.35
Under Durham the accused could know the nature and quality of his
act, know that it was wrong, have the will power to restrain his act
and yet, by reason of a mental disease, develop egocentric or sadistic
tendencies which could produce homicide with criminal impunity. 36
The New Hampshire Rule
The New Hampshire Rule will only be mentioned in passing. Funda-
mentally, the New Hampshire Rule and the Durham Rule are the same,37
although there is argument to the contrary.38 An author recently suggested
that the experts in New Hampshire were not familiar with the rule
and were not interpreting it properly.39 According to his article,40 some
doctors in New Hampshire questioned whether the accused knew right
from wrong in arriving at an opinion as to sanity. In fact, the experts
mentioned in his article are familiar with the rule named after their
own state. Every medical school teaching psychiatry has a course in
forensic psychiatry where the student doctors are taught the different
basic theories of criminal responsibility and which, of necessity, includes
a discussion of the New Hampshire doctrine. Their actions strongly
proclaim their difficulty in giving an opinion on mental competency
based on the New Hampshire Rule. The conduct of these experts speaks
louder than their words. They have come to realize that the application
33. Griffin v. State, 96 So.2d 424, 425 (Fla. App. 1957).
34. Hall, supra note 19, at 683.
35. Ibid.
36. State v. Davies, 146 Conn. 137, 148, 148 A.2d 251, 256, cert. denied, 360
U.S. 921 (1959).
37. Roche, Durham and the Problem of Communication, 29 TEMPLE L.Q. 264(1956): [Tihe Durham decision [marks] the passing of the McNaghten right and
wrong (knowledge) and the irresistible impulse tests . . . in the District of
Columbia, and the adopting of the essentials of the New Hampshire rule
which in sum determines that one cannot be held responsible if the evi-
dence considered by the jury shows beyond a reasonable doubt that the
unlawful act was the product of mental illness or defect. (Emphasis not
supplied.)
38. Reid, The Working of the New Hampshire Doctrine of Criminal Insanity,
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of the rule, in its strict interpretation, would result in every individual
involved in a crime being absolved from responsibility for his actions.
The right and wrong test is applied because they cannot determine if
one's criminal act was the product of a mental disease. These experts
do not know of any other approach to use in determining legal responsibility.
The conflict between the law and psychiatry will not terminate until
the experts are ready to admit on the witness stand what they maintain
medically: that there is no medical entity known as "temporary insanity."
If the accused was competent to stand trial, then psychiatry should
admit he was competent when he committed the crime.
CONCLUSION
This article has not attempted to answer every objection to the
McNaghten Rule, but it does demonstrate that a proper answer is available
for every objection. The true basis for the criticism of McNaghten is
that psychiatry seeks to have some vehicle available at its command by
which it can determine for itself whether an individual should be responsible
for his actions. Those psychiatrists who wish to change the law do not
believe that a person who is medically ill should be held criminally
responsible for his actions. Today, society still believes that mental
illness, no more than appendicitis, should excuse an individual from
responsibility for his criminal actions, if he was aware of its nature
and knew it was wrong to do it. Psychiatry is performing a noble service
to mankind in diagnosis and therapeutics. It should not bring disrepute
upon its profession by the illogical objections raised to the law. The
McNaghten Rule is capable of honest, sensible opinions, and does not
restrict the experts solely to a discussion of the patient's reasoning
abilities in the abstract.4" Since the issue of responsibility is the true
enigma of psychiatry, it should attempt to re-educate the public in
accordance with the new point of view opposing punishment for misdeeds.
Let them present compelling reasons, if they can, and obtain legislation
modeled after the criminal sexual psychopath law.42  Let them attempt
41. CLECKLEY, [HE MASK OF SANITY 520 (3d ed. 1955).
42. Criminal Sexual Psychopaths, FLA. STAT. § 917.12(1) (1959):
(1) Definition.- All persons suffering from a mental disorder and not
insane or feeble-minded which mental disorder has existed for a period
of not less than four months immediately prior to the appointment of
the psychiatrists provided for in subsection (2) (c) coupled with criminal
propensities to the commission of sex offenses and who may be consi-
dered dangerous to others are hereby declared to be criminal sexual
psychopaths.
FLA. STAT. § 917.12(2) (d) (1959):
If such person is determined to be a criminal sexual psychopathic
person by the court, then the court shall order and commit such person
to an appropriate institution under the jurisdiction of the board of
commissioners of state institutions until there are reasonable grounds
to believe that such person has recovered from such psychopathy to a
degree that he will not be a menace to others.
FLA. STAT. § 917.12(5) (1959);
Inapplicability in Capital Cases. - This act shall specifically not apply
to those persons charged with a capital offense.
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to enact a law which declares that everyone who commits murder is a
criminal psychopathic murderer and should be committed to a mental
institution. It is more dignified to acknowledge that this is the true
problem, and strive for its solution openly, rather than try to confound
the law with new unworkable and unrealistic definitions.
When psychiatry concedes that temporary insanity is an invention
of the creative minds of the legal profession, the conflict between the
law and psychiatry will end. This author has seldom witnessed a
conflict or dispute in opinion between psychiatrists on the issue of
present insanity. The dispute always arises on the issue of "temporary"
insanity. After four years of almost daily contact with psychiatrists, this
author is more convinced than ever that there is no scientific method
of determining whether the accused's criminal action was the product
of a mental disease or defect. It is hoped that there will soon be a
breakthrough in the field of psychiatry which will scientifically reveal
what causes a person to commit a crime. Until then, and until society is
prepared to abandon punishment for crime, to substitute psychiatrists for
prosecutors and hospitals for prisons, the law should reject any backhanded
attempt to accomplish this result by so-called new modern formulas.
APPENDIX
Contained herein are the basic diagnostic findings of the psychiatrists
taken from their actual testimony or their reports filed in the cases.
The projected verdicts under the Durham Rule are those of the author,
based upon conversations with the psychiatrists involved in the particular
cases, who stated that the criminal act was caused by a mental disease
or defect of the subject examined. The author believes that no purpose
would be served by naming the doctors or the cases involved.
Case No. 1:
CHARGE: FIRST DEGREE MURDER
Dr. "A"
Organic brain syndrome; delusional.
VERDICT - MCNAGHTEN RULE:
Insane at time of examination. Committed to State Hospital.
,PROJECTED VERDICT - DURHAM RULE:
Same as above.
Case No. 2:
CHARGE: FIRST DEGREE MURDER
RESULT: CONVICTED OF FIRST DEGREE MURDER WITH RECOMMENDATION
OF MERCY
1961]
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Dr. "A"
No definite evidence of any form of neurosis, psychosis or personality
disorder; no evidence of unstable personality or inadequate emotionality;
immature intellectual capacity; legally sane.
Dr. "B"
Neurosis in the form of an inadequate emotionally unstable personality;
knew nature and quality of act but emotional condition was such
as not to permit the use of his mental faculties to determine right
from wrong at the time the act was committed.
Dr. "C"
Defendant has I.Q. of 62 and is therefore mentally defective; on
the basis of psychometric examination, establishing that he is mentally
defective, his ability to determine right from wrong is seriously impaired.
VERDICT - MCNAGHTEN RULE:
Sane.
PROJECTED VERDICT- DURHAM RULE:
Insane.
(Dr. "B" suggested the defendant would be insane under either
rule and Dr. "C" suggested that the defendant's crime was a direct
result of his mental defectiveness.)
Case No. 3:
CHARGE: RAPE
RESULT: CONVICTED OF ASSAULT WITH INTENT TO COMMIT RAPE
Dr. "A"
Cannot express an opinion as to whether or not the defendant knew
right from wrong because "right from wrong" is not a clinical entity;
can only say whether (a) the individual could exercise conscious
control of his behavior, or (b) he was consciously unaware of what
went on about him. The doctor testified the defendant was medically
sane. (See Note under Case 15, Dr. "D")
Dr. "B"
Legally sane, if sober; passive personality; basically unable to assume
responsibility in a mature fashion.
VERDICT - McNAGHTEN RULE:
Sane.





CHARGE: FIRST DEGREE MURDER
RESULT: CONVICTED OF FIRST DEGREE MURDER WITH RECOMMENDATION
OF MERCY
Dr. "A"
Personality trait disturbance; emotional instability with psychotic epi-
sodes in the past; doubtful that he knew right from wrong at time
of incident.
Dr. "B"
Underlying psychotic process; most likely schizophrenic reaction of a
paranoid type; knew right from wrong at time of incident.
Dr. "C"
Paranoid, schizophrenia; presently competent but unable to distinguish
right from wrong at time of crime.
Dr. "D"
Schizophrenia, paranoid type, mentally competent; knew right from
wrong at the time of the incident.





CHARGE: FIRST DEGREE MURDER
Dr. "A"
Dementia praecox, paranoid type. Insane at time of examination.
Dr. "B"
Chronic paranoid schizophrenia. Insane at time of examination.
VERDICT - McNAGHTEN RULE:
Insane at time of examination. Committed to State Hospital.
PROJECTED VERDICT-DURHAM RULE:
Same as above.
Note: Four months after commitment of this defendant to the
State Hospital she was released as being medically and legally
competent.
404 UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW [VOL. XV
Case No. 6:
CHARGE: FIRST DEGREE MURDER
RESULT: CONVICTED OF SECOND DEGREE MURDER
Dr. "A"
Non-psychotic. Knew right from wrong at time of incident.
Dr. "B"
Non-psychotic. Knew right from wrong at time of incident.
VERDICT - McNAGHTEN RULE:
Sane.
PROJECTED VERDICT- DURHAM RULE:
Unknown.
Case No. 7:
CHARGE: FIRST DEGREE MURDER
RESULT: CONVICTED OF MANSLAUGHTER
Dr. "A"
No evidence of psychiatric or neurologic disease; knew right from
wrong at time of incident.
Dr. "B"
Psychoneurosis; dissociative reaction in a somewhat schizoid personality.
Dr. "C"
Psychoneurosis; mixed type; severe with dissociative reaction; did not
know right from wrong at time of incident.
Dr. "D"
Schizoid personality; tendency to obsessive compulsive behavior; probably
knew right from wrong at time of incident.





CHARGE: FIRST DEGREE MURDER
RESULT: CONVICTED OF FIRST DEGREE MURDER WITH RECOMMENDATION
OF MERCY
Dr. "A"




Simulating psychosis; sane at time of incident.
Dr. "C"
Schizophrenia -paranoid type; insane at time of incident.
Dr. "D"
Schizophrenia; paranoid type; insane at time of incident.
Dr. "E"
Schizophrenia. Sane at time of incident.
VERDICT - McNAGHTEN RULE:
Sane.
PROJECTED VERDICT - DURHAM RULE:
Insane.
Case No. 9:
CHARGE: FIRST DECREE MURDER
RESULT: CONVICTED OF FIRST DEGREE MURDER WITH RECOMMENDATION
OF MERCY
Dr. "A"
Personality disorder with emotional instability and pathological
sexuality; knew right from wrong at time of incident.
Dr. "B"
Schizophrenic reaction, border line; personality pattern disturbance;
psychiatrically sick; knew right from wrong at time of incident.
VERDICT - McNAGHTEN RULE:
Sane.
PROJECTED VERDICT - DURHAM -RULE:
Insane.
Case No. 10:
CHARGE: FIRST DEGREE MURDER
RESULT: CONVICTED OF SECOND DEGREE MURDER
Dr. "A"
Mental deficiency; I.0. of 58; alcoholism; knew right from wrong
at time of incident.
Dr. "B"
Schizophrenic reaction - simple type; knew right from wrong at time
of incident.
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VERDICT - MCNAGHTEN RULE:
Sane.
PROJECTED VERDICT - DURHAM RULE:
Insane.
Case No. 11:
CHARGE: FIRST DEGREE MURDER
RESULT: CONVICTED OF FIRST DEGREE MURDER WITH RECOMMENDATION
OF MERCY
Dr. "A"
Hyperexcitable and overly emotional; knew right from wrong at time
of incident.
Dr. "B"
Large amount of paranoid material, but not psychotic and legally sane
at time of incident.
VERDICT - MCNAGHTEN RULE:
Sane.
PROJECTED VERDICT- DURHAM RULE:
Unknown.
Case No. 12:
CHARGE: FIRST DEGREE MURDER
RESULT: CONVICTED OF FIRST DEGREE MURDER WITH RECOMMENDATION
OF MERCY
Dr. "A"
No evidence of mental disease, defect or derangement.
Dr. "B"
No defect noted.
VERDICT - MCNAGIITEN RULE:
Sane.
PROJECTED VERDICT- DURHAM RULE:
Unknown.
Case No. 13:
CHARGE: FIRST DEGREE MURDER




Non-psychotic; knew right from wrong at time of incident.
Dr. "B"
Acute alcoholism; psychoneurosis; obsessive compulsive reaction; does
not know if defendant knew right from wrong at time of incident.
VERDICT - McNAGHTEN RULE:
Sane.
PROJECTED VERDICT - DURHAM RULE:
Insane.
Case No. 14:
CHARGE: FIRST DEGREE MURDER
RESULT: CONVICTED OF SECOND DEGREE MURDER
Dr. "A"
Non-psychotic; laboring under considerable emotional stress at time of
incident, but knew right from wrong.
Dr. "B"
Acute dissociated reaction; is not medically responsible for his acts,
although knew right from wrong at time of incident.
(Note the attempt of the doctor to tell the court that in his
opinion the defendant should not be held responsible for his acts.)
Dr. "C"
No psychotic manifestations; knew right from wrong at time of incident.
VERDICT - McNAGHTEN RULE:
Sane.
PROJECTED VERDICT - DURHAM RULE:
Insane.
Case No. 15:
CHARGE: FIRST DEGREE MURDER
RESULT: NOT GUILTY
Dr. "A"
Personality pattern disturbance; schizoid personality without psychosis;
knew right from wrong at time of incident.
Dr. "B"
Sexual disturbance; flattening of affect; suggestion of disturbed person-
ality makeup but knew right from wrong at time of incident.
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Dr. "C"
Personality disorder; emotionally unstable personality; panic reaction-
state of disassociation; did not know right from wrong at time of incident.
Note: Dr. "C" testified that every one who commits murder is
suffering from some mental disorder.
Dr. "D"
Acute transient psychiatric maladjustment or disorder; did not know
right from wrong at time of incident.
Note: Dr. "D" is the same expert who in Case No. 3 testified
that lie could not give a clinical psychiatric opinion as to whether
or not an individual can distinguish right from wrong.
VERDICT - McNAGHTEN RULE:
Insane.
PROJECTED VERDICT - DURHAM RULE:
Insane.
